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Starting  with  the  signification  of  the  rationality  hypothesis  when  the  agent’s  contentment  is 
directly affected by the other agents’ decisions, the theory of games defines solutions for solving 
different  situations  of  conflict.  The  economic  actors  have  different  behaviours  of  the  Single 
Market. Oligopoly strategic behaviours were analysed by the Bertrand model. The two types 
revealed in the work show that strategic interactions are sensitive to the companies’ features, 
products  and  markets.  Regarding  the  situation  when  we  have  an  oligopoly  competition,  the 
companies make interdependent decisions in the environment affected by risk and uncertainty of 
the Single Market. For this reason it is an opportunity to study the structure of oligopoly type of 
of the Single Market with the aid of non – cooperative games.  
           




1. Introduction  
The economic models and the practice of economical - mathematics constituted an excellent 
instrument for studying the economic games, stimulating the research in this field. In the last 
decade, a series of methods regarding the representation of the economic theory were used in 
order to study the evolution of state parameters of the social- economic field. The category of 
systems highly studied in the economic dynamism are those who pattern the business circle, 
patterns of economic increase and patterns which study the costs game in a dynamic perspective. 
In  the  last  decade,  from  time  to  time,  evolution  and  chaotic  behaviour  were  noticed  in  the 
economic patterns. The main conception of the economic science was demonetized, which says 
that the economic balances are constant even with the lack of external shocks, the economy 
leaning towards a stationary state. 
From this point of view, conducting a study in a dynamic environment, about costs mechanism 
seems  to  be  a  very  important  problem.  Taking  into  account  the  cost  which  is  an  economic 
phenomenon, this work trying to approach it, using a modern instrument of work, belonging 
exclusively to mathematics, which is the game theory.  
We are interested in the theoretical results which are revealed in literature regarding the theory of 
games starting with the key concepts of this one: games, strategies, balance, game value, etc. the 
research is focused on the main oligopoly market structures from the microeconomics point of 
view.The theory of games studies the human behaviour in situations of conflict, where the reason 
is contrary to the reason, each of the parties involved being able to analyse and to decide in order 
to reach their own targets. It emphasises the meaning of the rationality hypothesis when the 
contentment of a person is directly affected by the other agents’ decisions and defines solutions 
for various situations of conflict. The theory of games is a  method of research for strategic 
interaction situations, where the economic agents are aware of the interdependence which exists 
between them and each of them will make their own decisions taking into account the others’ 
behaviour. 325 
 
The theory of games was first mentioned and historically related to the year 1944 when the 
mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern publish the famous 
work: Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour 
 
Augustin Cournot studied in 1838 the operation of the oligopoly markets where each company 
takes action knowing that its volume of production affects the market cost. In 1833 J. Bertrand 
studied the operation of the oligopoly markets where the companies with constant efficiencies 
produce the same product settling the selling price. The result mentioned by Bertrand is known as 
Bertrand paradox
186. In 1934 Stackelberg shows that some companies can be leader and that are 
able to impose the price to the others. The leader company, as a barometer company, knows best 
the market situation and has the means necessary in order to control the counter party. This 
doesn’t mean that the company is the most powerful but well informed and organised.  
The following question comes up: Which of the behaviours mentioned above should be followed 
of the Single Market? In order to answer this question, a theory was needed which could explain 
the interactions between companies. This is the great contribution of the game theory. It allows 
the elaboration of an analytical framework regarding the situations when an agent’s decisions can 
affect the earnings of the other agents. 
The theory of games studies the manner in which the rational decision are made by people in 
interactive situations when the results of their action depend directly on the others; actions. In this 
case, where the coordination of the individual actions is adjusted by competition, each economic 
agent (named player in the game theory) must forecast the future actions of the other agents and 
then optimise their own behaviour depending on the results. In the last two decades the rent-
seeking type of dynamic games were analysed (to share the fortune). A systematic study of the 
balance point for this kind of games was made by Okuguchi K. and Szidarovsky F. who revealed 
that these games are equal to the Cournot type of oligopoly with price hyperbolic function. 
The theory of games hyphens the meaning of the rationality hypothesis when the contentment of 
the person is directly affected by the decisions of the other agents and defines solutions for 
different situations of conflict. Out of this reason knowing the analysis instruments of this theory 
is  essential  nowadays,  the  theory  of  games  constituting  a  real  matrix  of  the  contemporary 
financial theory. Its postulates are based on the analysis of the people’s interdependent relations.  
The economic description and analysis must be oriented towards solving the conflicts caused by 
the problems of redistribution. The approach moves from solving problems related to assignment 
towards the analysis of the availability restrictions which influences the resources assignment and 
distribution. In conclusion, the economic reality can’t be properly presented by a static approach, 
as the traditional microeconomics theory does it, but it must be seen as a process, with the help of 
a dynamic approach, from the new microeconomics perspective.   
 
2. Competitive strategies of the Single Market. 
Some  of  the  economic  agents  have  a  different  behaviour  on  the  market  affecting  the  other 
economic agents’ behaviour. This type of reality resides in the “market structure” concept. The 
meaning of market structure represents the features of a market by the number and the relative 
power  of  the  companies  which  operate  on  the  market  having  the  purpose  of  settling  their 
behaviour  and  its  consequences  on  the  economic  efficiency  of  the  economic  system.  The 
contributions of the game theory to the study of the Single Market.can solve some problems 
related to the costs system and to the intelligence exchange. Competition was and is related to the 
behaviour  hypothesis  of  the  economic  agents  and  to  the  relative  hypothesis  of  the  market 
operation.  
                                                       
186 Binmore K., Jeux et théorie des jeux Ed. De Boeck Université,Bruxelles,2001, p.23 
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The market structures vary depending on: the influence on the costs settlement; the companies’ 
production of standardized or non - standardized products; the companies’ possibility to enter on 
the market; the publicity, the products’ features, etc. The oligopoly means a market structure 
controlled by a restricted number of producers, the actions of each producer affecting the others 
competitors’  actions.  If  a  producer  cuts  the  price  in  order  to  increase  the  sales,  then  its 
competitors will react by cutting their price too, thing which will determine a profit decrease for 
the first company. Before making the decision regarding the price cut, the oligopoly company 
would have to analyse first the future reaction of its competitors and the consequences upon it. In 
the first works on oligopoly, Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883), write about the elements used 
by the theory of games for analyse of the imperfect competition. The theory of games uses a 
general method of analysing the strategic interaction situations. This theory applies on analysing 
the companies’ strategic behaviour of the Single Market, starting with the general framework of a 
game situation.  
The  game  situations  are  based  on  few  important  elements:  game  rules;  strategies  to  follow; 
earnings  and  in  oligopoly  situations  we  have:  rules  of  the  oligopoly  game;  strategies  of  the 
oligopoly  game;  earnings  of  the  oligopoly  game.  The  rules  of  an  oligopoly  game  are  made 
starting with the features of the economic, social and politic environment of the oligopoly market, 
with the laws of the trade practices. One of these rules regards the number of players meaning the 
number of companies operating on the market. The rules of an oligopoly game represent all the 
possible actions of each player. This one makes a complete list of game strategies. The possible 
strategies in an oligopoly game can be: prices increase, cutting prices or keeping them at the 
same level; increase, decrease or keeping the production at the same level; more, less or the same 
advertising; improving, lowering or maintaining the quality, etc. The earnings of an oligopoly 
game may be represented by the economic profits or losses of each company
187. The earnings of 
the companies depend on their strategies and on their constraints which they deal with. 
Studying the situations of imperfect competition, especially the Single Market where the buyers’ 
decisions  are  interdependent,  can  be  achieved  with  the  help  of  non  –  cooperative  games. 
Important  applications  of  the  game  theory  reside  in  different  aspects  of  the  oligopoly 
competition, for example: secret agreements or price forming study in a closed economic system. 
The  situation  of  oligopoly  competition,  the  companies  can’t  deal  with  an  unreceptive 
environment.  The  interdependent  situations  between  different  centres  of  decision  and  their 
contribution to obtaining a credible solution can be done with the help of non-cooperative games 
which developed a lot over the last years.   
For the duopoly games, the possible strategies the two companies can follow are: agreement for 
profit division; or breaking the first agreement, thing that would allow the cheating company to 
obtain greater profits than its partner. This kind of structure is similar to the one of the game 
named prisoner’s dilemma
188. In case of a balance situation the two companies break or follow 
the duopoly agreement, they will sell at the same price, producing the same volume and obtaining 
the profit of a monopolist. 
The theoreticians of the game with practice in economy showed that price war can be considered 
to be the result of a repeated duopoly game. The producers follow the concluded agreements until 
the request variation determine the price cut under a certain limit. The companies’ reaction to the 
price cut is like it would be the result of a problem the competitors deal with. They have to 
operate in order to make the competitors believe in the penalty in case of agreement breakage. 
Updating the credibility of the menaces is important in order to respect the agreement as longer 
as possible. On this kind of markets, from time to time, price war can occur, which can end with 
the exclusion from the market of the weaker competitors. 
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3. The Bertrand model 
Bertrand (1883) suggested a solution which depended on price variation; he started with a rather 
simple case where two companies produce the same product, settling their selling price. The 
production costs for each product are constant (marked with letter „c”) and identical for both 
companies. In this case the consumers will buy from the company which has lower prices. We 
suppose that the two companies share the total request in two, if the prices are the same. 
Bertrand’s paradoxical result is that at an equilibrium level the price is equal to the marginal cost 
and the profits are null. None of the companies can improve the profits because it would obtain a 
negative one cutting the price. If a company settles a price higher than the marginal cost, the 
other company will be interested in settling a lower price in order to cover the entire request. The 
question is if Nash equilibrium is present where the price is equal to the marginal cost. The Nash 
equilibrium, if present, is it unique?  
In the Bertrand model, Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies weakly controlled: some 
players are not interested in settling an equal or higher price than „c” (the cost), others set a price 
equal to „c”
189. An irrational player who sets a price (P) higher than the cost (c) he obtains the 
same profit as the player who will obtain Nash equilibrium if the competitor always sets a price 
(P) equal to the cost (c). The player’s irrationally occurs when a competitor must explore such 
behaviour, choosing a price (P1) higher to the cost but lower to P. This kind of argument shows 
that players can be interested in manipulating their competitors making them believe that they are 
irrational. If player 1 is an agent with “irrational” reputation, choosing a monopoly price, then 
player 2 sets a price P2 lower to the monopoly one. But he is not sure that player 1, declared 
irrational but being rational benefits by his reputation, then he will chose a price lower to P2. 
Such  reputation  problems  can  be  studied  in  a  dynamic  framework.  We  will  consider  the 
reputation game for two companies of the Single Market, marking with δ the discount factor and 
trying to settle the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The game can run by converse induction taking 
into account the beliefs. If the cooperation was supported in the first period, then in the final 
period the players will have the same reputation. If the players broke the agreement then they 
would lose the initial reputation. But choosing a cooperative strategy the player maintains the 
reputation,  without  bringing  any  new  information  regarding  his  behaviour,  meaning  the 
cooperative one. If we assume that the players cooperated in the first period then in the last one, a 
player obtained αδπ this one being a price lower than the monopoly one. The question which 
rises is: are the players interested in cooperating at the beginning? The company has an updated 
hope for earning equal to α (π/2 +δπ) in case of cooperation. In case of non cooperation for the 
entire  monopoly  profit  the  company  will  obtainαπ,  losing  its  reputation.  The  company  is 
interested in cooperation when δ ≥ ½. This model shows that the companies can be interested in 
cooperating at the beginning when their option for the present is low enough. In this case, we can 
talk  about  cooperation  at the  beginning  of  the  game  which  degenerates  in  a price  war. The 
reputation phenomena can be very important if there is the slightest incertitude regarding the 
perfect rationality of the players.  Such a feature can explain many behaviours assuming that the 
players believe there are other “irrational” players but with a lower probability.  
The  examples  mentioned  above  express  the  result  of  the  strategic  interaction  which  is  very 
sensitive to the companies’, products’ and markets’ features. There are many different situations 
by which the consequences of these features can be studied (for example: the problems related to 
noticing the products’ quality, the advertising, the strategies of research and development, the 
network of distribution, the possibilities of market input and output). If we start with a normal 
game (x1, ..., xn; u1,...,un) we will assume that the players behaviour is decentralized, each of them 
having to chose alone a strategy, ignoring any decision of other players. The communication 
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possibility between players is excluded.  There is no initial result or a game history which could 
emphasize the strategies used more frequently than the one of the others.  We can take into 
account  all  the  strategies  as  being  a  priori  equally  possible  and  also  the  choice  of  the  best 
strategy. 
In order to determine a non - cooperative behaviour the controlling strategies can be removed. 
Strategy Yi of player “i” is controlled by strategy xi (where the results (x1, ..., xi-1; yi, xi+1...,xn) 
represent a non – controlling assembly of strategies of player “i”) when whatever would be the 
strategic choice of other players, the use of xi is at least as profitable for “i” than the use of “yi”, 
meaning  strategy  “xi”  better  than  yi.  The  games  which  have  an  equilibrium  regarding  the 
controlling strategies will be the decentralized solution of the non-cooperative game.  
The strategy used by the company of the Single Market depends on the forecasts made on the 
reactions of the competitor companies, its analysis can be achieved with the help of the “game 
theory”. In this game each player must choose between a pacifist strategy and an aggressive 
strategy. The results of this game are described in picture nr.1. 
 
    Y
* 
    Pacifist  Aggressive  
￿
$%￿
Pacifist   (2, 2)  (0, 3) 
Aggressive   (3, 0)  (1, 1) 
Fig. 1 — Game matrix of the Single Market. 
 
In picture 1 each of the four boxes in the game matrix represent a result of the game with use of 
X
* in left and use of Y
* in right. We can verify if the pacifist strategy of a player is controlled by 
his aggressive strategy. In our situation the game has only an equilibrium in controlling strategies 
(aggressive, aggressive) which corresponds to an open price war of the Single Market. Such a 
result is not acceptable because the result “peace” meaning (pacifist, pacifist) is proffered by the 
two players in other words the war is not an optimal Pareto. The dilemma of the game shows that 
for a player which is not entirely sure on the pacifist intentions of its partner the use of the 
aggressive  strategies  is  needed  to  follow  the  individual  interests  but  the  mutual  interest 
recommends that everything has to be done in order to obtain a pacifist result. 
The dynamic approach of the economic reality goes to the change of parameters of the variables 
which economic and social life. The key to survive in case of economic games is the capability of 
the companies to adjust their strategies to the environment which is in continuous change
190. A 
correct forecast of the future events it is necessary. The cross - impact analysis, the request - 
hazard forecast as well as other numerous scenarios are just a few of the methodologies used in 
economic forecasts.  
 
4. Conclusions  
In the economy structural changes and oscillations are the rule and not the exception and the 
stationary  states  become  instable  when  certain  parameters  vary.  The  economic  actors  have 
different behaviours on the Single Market which have different consequences depending on the 
number, relative size and strategies approached by the other economic actors. Starting with the 
rationality hypothesis when the agent’s contentment is affected by the others decisions the game 
theory defines solutions for solving the situations of conflict.  
                                                       
190 Sirghi Nicoleta, Microeconomie Aprofundata. Teorie si aplicatii, Editura Mirton, Timisoara, 2008, p.92. 
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The economic level of the competition can be considered as a mechanism of resources allocation 
which  allows, in  many  cases, the promotion  of the  economical  efficiency. The  game  theory 
contribution to the development of the competition politics can solve some problems related to 
the price system and to the intelligence exchange. For this reason the notion of competition was 
and is related first to the behaviour hypothesis of the economical agents and second to the relative 
hypothesis of the market operation. When the coordination of the individual actions is adjusted 
by competition, each economic agent must forecast the other agents’ actions and then maximise 
depending on the results their own behaviour.  
Conducting a study in a dynamic environment regarding the Single Market represents a very 
important problem of the contemporary economy. We are interested in the theoretical results 
which are revealed in literature regarding the theory of games starting with the key concepts of 
this  one:  games,  strategies,  balance,  game  value,  etc.  The  research  is  focused  on  the  main 
oligopoly market structures from the microeconomics point of view. For this reason it is an 
opportunity to study the structure of oligopoly type of markets with the aid of non – cooperative 
games. 
The use of the game theory as reference framework regarding the representation of the economic 
agents’ on different market structure opens the way for an expansive field of investigation. The 
problem of the economic agents is no longer. The problem of the economic agents is no longer 
conducting studies for the operation of the perfect competition markets but to analyse the means 
in  which  they  can  coordinate  the  decisions,  in  dynamic  configurations  in  a  competitive 
environment affected by risk and uncertainty. 
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